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BOOK REVIEW
REALISM IN TH~oRY AND PRACTICE. By Karl N.
Llewellyn. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp.
531. $8.95.

JUIUSPRUDENCE:

The realists in juristic thought began in the 1930's a scattered yet
coherent protest against myths surrounding judicial law. Karl Llewellyn was one of the early leaders in this movement. He did not accept
the intellectually lazy attitudes of some contemporaries who mistook
obfuscation for perception, who were content with a philosophy
based on a hunch, intuition, or some indeterminate emotional preconception of judges. He thought the "very heart" of the matter was
the "behavior of judges." Thus he suggested a "new approach to law
as a social science, as a matter of behavior to be seen, recorded, and
studied as we see and record the work of men in industry."'
The consummation of Llewellyn's particular interest in the craft
of appellate judging was his classic The Common Law Tradition:
Deciding Appeals, which he completed in 1960. After reading it,
no appellate judge could decide a case or write an opinion without
being affected to some extent by Llewellyn's method and criteria.
He conceived of law as the product of a rational process. The traditional dichotomy of reason and experience are reconcilable by development of legal methods in a rational framework. This technique
clarifies and supports the sociological jurisprudence of Holmes,
Cardozo, and Brandeis. Llewellyn's analysis and description of the
styles of common-law opinion writing, and his insistence in appellate
judging upon a candid appraisal of the rules and the reasons for them,
are a contemporary tour de force. That book was documented by an
analysis of representative decisions from many state appellate courts.
The Common Law Tradition is a guide for appellate judges and
advocates. It requires both to reassess themselves and their work.
Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice is not a general
collection of Llewellyn's papers, but an organization of a number
of them around the theme of juristic realism. Llewellyn died eight
days after he wrote the preface. The twenty-nine papers are divided
into four parts: "Realism"; "Institution, Rules, and Craft"; "Controlling Behavior: How and Why?"; and "Men." The first and second
occupy the largest portion of this volume.
1. LLEWELLYN, Legal Tradition and Social
R.ALism IN THEoRY AND PRACTICE 100 (1962);

in Retrospect, 14 VAND. L. REv. 317 (1960).

Science Method, in JURISPRUDENCE:
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Lleweyllyn loved life with a continuing awareness of its brevity.
With a forceful and somewhat bombastic style, he had the rare
gifts of kindness and friendship. Despite many disagreements, his
review of Pound's Jurisprudence concluded that Pound contributed
"more than any other individual (unless perhaps John Dewey)
to
making legal thought in this country result-minded, cause-minded,
and process-minded." 2 Other essays about Holfeld and Holmes are
about co-adventurers, men who also realized that judges have "molecular law-making power," and who sought to ascertain the full significance of that fact.
Two essays deal particularly with the control of behavior by law.
Beyond the rules are the more important techniques, ideology, and
unspoken ideals of the law. In "Group Prejudice and Social Education," written in 1944, Llewellyn said "there are ways of diminishing or conquering group prejudice, and ... those ways can be put
to work on adults as on children." At bottom it is a "prejudice in
favor of 'My Own Group' as against all others . . . ." Corrective
machinery must contain measures which are capable of employment
now, "with means and personnel which are at hand," and such
measures "do not depend on any preliminary wide-scale political or
,,3
social reform ....
In 1957, discussing "What Law Cannot Do For Inter-Racial Peace,"
he thought "the machinery of law-government has no need to lag
behind or to lag with or to uncreatively just fit into the existing
ways of people in their race relations .... ." The machinery of lawgovernment can be built to set up ideals still far from attainment.
"But the second thing is no less clear: put tension on too suddenly,
too sharply, too hard, and your wire can snap, can even snap back
into that devastation called destruction and reaction. It is a fine trite
truth that the art of statesmanship lies in finding workable measures,
in introducing them with patient skill, in following them through
with firmness, and with courage, and also with tact."4
The esthetic phase of a legal system is related to architecture rather
than painting. "Architecture and engineering strike most closely
home-perhaps because both look so directly and so inescapably to
use."5 Llewellyn's functional approach to jurisprudence is illustrated
in the definitive essay, "On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in
Law." Form and style, as in many of Holmes' opinions, have a functional duty: "They drive to a point ... they drive to a policy; they
2. LLEWELLYN, Roscoe

Pound, in

JRISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

501 (1962).
3. Lmv.ELLYN, Group Prejudice and Social Education, in id. at 452-53.
4. LLWELLYN, What Law Cannot Do for Inter-racial Peace, in id. at 481.
5. LLEvELLYN, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, in id. at 174.
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drive to technical accuracy, to justice in the case at hand, to right
guidance for the future. Love them, or leave them, it is rare that
you can miss in any of them any of these attributes. Their beauty
man, but it is
is functional; the prose is clean by the nature of the
6
thrice clean because hewn powerful to purpose."
One can distinguish in American history three marked style-periods
in judicial opinions. In the 1830's and early 1840's, there was the
formative style of reason, or the "Grand Style." In the early 1900's
there developed the "Formal Style"-authoritarian, formal, superficially logical, emphasizing rules and precedents. The courts usually
acted in terms "of the felt reason of the situation," but talked in
terms of the formal style. A third style has emerged or returned today, in terms of a recapture of rationalism, or the "Grand Style." Its
basic elements are a conscious, overt concern about policy and an
emphasis upon reason and situation-sense, by relating the type of
case to a sense-making result. Although carefully evaluating rules
and precedent, the courts are constantly reworking them in order
better to effectuate a "functional evaluation." Legal authority and
ordinary common sense are supplemented with such technical data
of fact and expert opinion as are available, or can be made available,
to inform a judgment.
In short, the craft of appellate judging calls for an "open, reasoned
extension, restriction or reshaping of the relevant rules, done in terms
not of the equities or sense of the particular case or of the particular
parties, but instead (illuminated indeed by those earthy particulars)
done in terms of7 the sense and reason of some significantly seen type
of life-situation."
Llewellyn's interests ranged over any behavior touching the law.
This book contains perceptive, original essays concerning a wide
variety of problems affecting the law: the economic troubles of the
bar, and some "poultices and cures"; the "American Common Law
Tradition in American Democracy"; "The Modern Approach to
Counselling and Advocacy"I; "The Content of a Jurisprudence
Course"; and "The Study of Law as a Liberal Art." Running throughout is a realist's evaluation of the "Is" aspect, "based on examination
of law in terms of its effects, rather than in terms of the symmetry
of its traditional rules." 8 Ironically, Llewellyn and some other realists
viewed the positive law somewhat as do natural law jurists; as present
and significant but requiring reexamination. Certainly society and
the administration of justice will be served best by a continuing
6. Id. at 173.
7. LLWmELLN, On the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition, in id. at 219-20.
8. RAUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE: ITS AMERICAN PROPHETS 204 (1951).
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reevaluation. The totality of Llewellyn's work cannot be appraised
accurately at this time, but assuredly his penetrating mind, flashing
wit, and probing beneath the surface have lighted up the interior
of the massive external structure of Anglo-American law.
The once hotly debated position of the realists, and in particular
that of Llewellyn, has now been generally accepted. Functional
rather than conceptual, it emphasizes the "Is" rather than the
"Ought," the living organism beneath the skin of the rules of law.
Throughout both The Common Law Tradition and Jurisprudence,he
removes any misconception and makes it clear that the law must
be subject to moral evaluation. Perhaps to a greater degree than in
his other books, jurisprudence conveys to the reader Llewellyn's
enthusiastic love for the law, the wide range of his scholarship and
interests, and his superb originality and independence.
The life of the law is both reason and experience. It effectively
serves society only when informed judges and advocates are engaged
continually in reevaluating it, and restating the reasons for its particular applications. To the quest for this ideal, Karl Llewellyn perhaps has contributed more than anyone in our time. Light was his
master image. In this sense, he was the intellectual heir of the Greek
tradition. As Edith Hamilton once said, "Homer's hero who cried
for more light even if it were but light to die in, was a true Greek.
They could never leave anything obscure."9
HON.
9. HAmuLTON, TnE GREEx WAY 28 (1963).
* Associate Justice, Mississippi Supreme Court.
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